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REALITY CHECK:  
A MODEST MODIFICATION TO RATIONALIZE 
RULE 803 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS 
Liesa L. Richter* 
 
[T]he values of hearsay declarations or writings, and the need for them, in 
particular situations cannot with any degree of realism be thus minutely 
ticketed in advance . . . .  Too much worthless evidence will fit the 
categories, too much that is vitally needed will be left out.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Rules of Evidence (or “the Rules”) identify hearsay that is 
admissible, notwithstanding the classic hearsay prohibition, by delineating 
categories of hearsay statements that may be admitted into evidence.2  For 
example, “dying declarations” of now-unavailable declarants may be 
admitted in homicide prosecutions or civil cases.3  “Excited utterances” 
relating to a startling event also may be admitted for their truth.4  The 
purported justification for admitting certain categories of hearsay rests upon 
the inherent reliability of human statements uttered in certain contexts, as 
well as litigants’ need for crucial evidence to build cases.5 
Criticism of this categorical approach to hearsay is longstanding.6  As 
illustrated by Professor Charles McCormick’s critique above, detractors 
 
*  William J. Alley Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law.  I would like 
to thank the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence for hosting this dialogue 
about the future of hearsay and for including me in the conversation. 
 
 1. Charles T. McCormick, Tomorrow’s Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A. J. 507, 512 (1938) 
(advocating a discretionary approach to hearsay evidence and criticizing “sharp categories” 
of hearsay exceptions as “strange”). 
 2. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:66 (4th 
ed. 2013) (noting that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence chose “prescriptive and 
limiting” categories of hearsay exceptions). 
 3. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). 
 4. Id. 803(2). 
 5. Id. 803 advisory committee’s note (“[U]nder appropriate circumstances a hearsay 
statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify 
nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Paul S. Milich, Hearsay Antinomies:  The Case for Abolishing the Rule and 
Starting Over, 71 OR. L. REV. 723, 774–78 (1992); David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last 
Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 (opining that lawyers sometimes develop a “fondness” for 
the “oddities of hearsay law,” but that it is the sort of “affection a volunteer docent might 
develop for the creaky, labyrinthine corridors of an ancient mansion, haphazardly expanded 
over the centuries”). 
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prior to the enactment of the Rules complained that preordained hearsay 
categories could never accurately capture reliable human communications.7  
Of course, the Federal Rules of Evidence answered the concern that 
categorical exceptions would miss or omit reliable hearsay that is vitally 
needed for the resolution of a case by including the residual exception to the 
hearsay prohibition.8  Pursuant to the residual exception, trial judges have 
the discretion to admit hearsay that does not fit within the preordained 
categories so long as it enjoys equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness.9  
But concerns about “worthless evidence” fitting within the categories of 
admissible hearsay have never been addressed within the Rules, and the 
hearsay exceptions continue to draw fire on this account.10  Most recently, 
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sharply 
criticized the present sense impression and excited utterance hearsay 
exceptions in his concurring opinion in United States v. Boyce,11 opining 
that those categorical exceptions are capable of admitting wholly unreliable 
hearsay statements.12 
Critics have proposed various responses to the perceived failings of the 
categorical model.  For example, Professor Edmund Morgan proposed 
admitting all hearsay statements made by testifying or unavailable 
declarants to avoid altogether categorical hearsay exceptions and questions 
about the reliability of hearsay statements.13  Judge Jack Weinstein 
proposed a discretionary approach to hearsay, allowing the trial judge to 
weigh the probative force of particular hearsay statements on a case-by-case 
basis.14  In his recent concurrence in Boyce, Judge Posner echoed Judge 
Weinstein’s approach and suggested that the categorical hearsay exceptions 
 
 7. See also Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 337 
(1961) (“Wigmore’s rationale . . . makes admissible a class of hearsay rather than particular 
hearsay for which, in the circumstances of the case, there is need and assurance of 
reliability.” (emphasis added)). 
 8. FED. R. EVID. 807. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 1, 38–47 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1942) (describing how much probative evidence the hearsay rule excludes and 
how much unreliable evidence of low probative value the categorical hearsay exceptions 
permit); Richard D. Friedman, Truth and Its Rivals in the Law of Hearsay and 
Confrontation, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 545, 552 (1998) (opining that “few lawyers are satisfied 
with the cracker-barrel psychology that underlies exceptions like the one for excited 
utterances”); Weinstein, supra note 7, at 339 (“[A] series of independent letters written by 
disinterested ministers who were eyewitnesses to an event and who are shown to have acute 
vision, sound memories, and clear powers of communication might well be given more 
weight than many dying declarations or implied admissions which may be made by a party 
having no knowledge of the event or may have been made many years before by a 
predecessor in interest who had every motive to lie.”). 
 11. 742 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2014); id. at 801 (“[A]s with much of the folk psychology of 
evidence, it is difficult to take this rationale . . . entirely seriously.” (quoting Lust v. Sealy, 
Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir. 2004))). 
 12. Id. at 800–01 (opining that there are flaws in the justifications for present sense 
impressions and excited utterances). 
 13. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE r. 503. 
 14. See Weinstein, supra note 7, at 337–38 (advocating for greater discretionary power 
for trial judges to admit hearsay evidence and criticizing class-based hearsay exceptions). 
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should be dismantled and that the residual or catchall hearsay exception 
should drive every decision about the admissibility of hearsay evidence.15  
This proposed change would require trial judges to consider the reliability 
of hearsay on a statement-by-statement basis to determine admissibility, 
thus permitting a more individualized assessment of hearsay evidence. 
This modification would create broader discretion to admit hearsay 
evidence, but it also would allow the trial judge new flexibility to exclude 
or reject hearsay evidence that has long been admissible through categorical 
exceptions.  In this way, Judge Posner’s proposal addresses longstanding 
concerns about “worthless” hearsay being admitted and resolves his own 
dissatisfaction with being constrained to admit hearsay through the 
allegedly suspect present sense impression and excited utterance 
exceptions.16 
In a recent article, I explored the significant costs and scant benefits of 
the purely discretionary approach to hearsay evidence proposed by Judge 
Posner.17  That article highlighted the uncertainty, unfairness, and 
inconsistency inherent in such an approach.  Accordingly, the article 
concluded that dismantling the categorical hearsay exceptions in favor of a 
single discretionary residual exception would diminish efficiency and 
fairness in the litigation market at a time when exploding costs threaten the 
utility of the jury trial as a mechanism for dispute resolution.18 
Rejecting Judge Posner’s discretionary approach, however, does nothing 
to answer his criticism that the current categorical hearsay exceptions allow 
unreliable statements to be admitted into evidence.  Of course, one possible 
response to this criticism is:  Who cares?  There are credible arguments to 
be made that the primary function of the categorical exceptions is to provide 
a degree of certainty about admissible hearsay, that no system that provides 
such certainty can realistically hope to achieve perfect reliability, and that 
the categorical exceptions are serving their purpose notwithstanding the 
possibility that they will allow some unreliable hearsay into evidence.19 
That said, the ceaseless criticism of the categorical exceptions for 
admitting the unreliable is difficult to ignore, particularly when it comes 
from authorities like Judge Posner and a panel of the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals.20  Should the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of 
 
 15. Boyce, 742 F.3d at 802 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 16. Id. at 801 (“It is time the law awakened from its dogmatic slumber.”). 
 17. Liesa L. Richter, Posnerian Hearsay:  Slaying the Discretion Dragon, 67 FLA. L. 
REV. 1861, 1861 (2015). 
 18. Id. at 1866, 1907–08. 
 19. Id. at 1894–907 (discussing strong arguments in favor of maintaining existing 
categorical hearsay exceptions); see also Symposium on Hearsay Reform, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1323, 1364–68 (2016) (describing crucial certainty provided by the scheme of 
categorical hearsay exceptions). 
 20. Many scholars have offered similar criticisms of the present sense impression and 
excited utterance exceptions. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain 
Future of Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 337–38 (2012) (advocating a 
corroboration limitation on the present sense impression exception to control flow of 
unreliable electronic hearsay); Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense Impressions Cannot 
Live in the Past, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 907 (2001) (proposing an amendment to eliminate 
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Evidence (or “the Advisory Committee”) seek to address this longstanding 
criticism, there are alternatives to the Posner proposal that could respond to 
concerns about the categorical exceptions without generating the same costs 
and inefficiencies.  This Article theorizes about one potential amendment to 
Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that could address old and new 
criticisms that the hearsay exceptions in that Rule are capable of admitting 
unreliable and “worthless” hearsay. 
If courts and commentators continue to be concerned about the fallible 
assumptions of reliability underlying the Rule 803 exceptions, the Advisory 
Committee could propose to expand the “trustworthiness” exception—
which is an existing feature of the business and public records exceptions—
to additional Rule 803 exceptions, like the much-maligned present sense 
impression and excited utterance exceptions.  This modification would 
allow the opponent of hearsay evidence falling within those exceptions the 
opportunity to show that the hearsay statements nonetheless lack 
trustworthiness due to the circumstances of their making or the sources of 
their information. 
With this amendment, Professor McCormick’s pre-Rules criticism of 
categorical exceptions would finally be answered.  The residual exception 
would continue to permit the admission of reliable hearsay not captured by 
the categorical exceptions, and this new modification would permit the 
exclusion of demonstrably unreliable statements that happen to fit within 
those preordained categories. 
I.  AN OLD FRIEND:  
THE TRUSTWORTHINESS EXCEPTION 
Rules 803(6), (7), and (8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence all include a 
trustworthiness exception to the admissibility of the hearsay statements that 
they describe.21  As an example, Rule 803(6), the business records 
exception, provides that business records satisfying the basic requirements 
of the exception are admissible so long as “the opponent does not show that 
the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation 
indicate a lack of trustworthiness.”22  The absence of business records and 
public records exceptions contain similar provisos.23 
The origins of these trustworthiness exceptions can be traced to the pre-
Rules U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Palmer v. Hoffman.24  The Palmer 
suit was brought against the trustees of a railroad company due to a grade 
crossing accident that killed the plaintiff’s spouse.25  By the time of trial, 
 
“immediately after” language in the present sense impression exception); Alan G. Williams, 
Abolishing the Excited Utterance Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 
717, 757–59 (2015) (reacting to Judge Posner’s Boyce concurrence with a proposal to 
abolish Rule 803(2) in favor of an excited utterance-like exception requiring both 
unavailability and corroboration). 
 21. FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E), (7)(C), (8)(B). 
 22. Id. 803(6)(E). 
 23. Id. 803(7)(C), (8)(B). 
 24. 318 U.S. 109 (1943). 
 25. Id. at 110–11. 
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the train engineer involved in the accident had died.26  Accordingly, the 
railroad company sought to introduce the engineer’s recorded statement of 
his version of the accident, arguing that the statement was routinely made in 
the regular course of the railroad company’s business.27  Applying the 
federal statute that was a precursor to Rule 803(6), the trial court excluded 
the statement, and the jury returned a verdict against the railroad.28  The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the 
engineer’s statement, finding it “dripping with motivations to 
misrepresent.”29 
In affirming exclusion of the engineer’s statement, the Supreme Court 
found that the accident report was not made in the course of the railroad’s 
regular business operations.30  According to the Court, admitting 
“employees’ versions of their accidents” as records made in the regular 
course of business would constitute a “real perversion of a rule designed to 
facilitate admission of records which experience has shown to be quite 
trustworthy.”31  The Court in Palmer, therefore, found that the engineer’s 
statement was not made in the regular course of railroading and that the 
threshold requirements of the business records statute were not satisfied.32 
In crafting Rule 803(6), the Advisory Committee noted that the exclusion 
of the record in Palmer was driven primarily by concerns about the railroad 
engineer’s incentives to falsify his account of the accident.33  
Acknowledging the impossibility of identifying specific business records 
that will be free of such concerns in all cases, the Advisory Committee 
elected to craft an exception that would admit all records routinely made in 
the course of a regularly conducted activity, “subject to authority to exclude 
if ‘the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness.’”34 
Thus, the trustworthiness exception to the business records exception 
recognizes the reality behind the Rule.  While the vast majority of records 
routinely made in the regular course of business are reliable due to the 
strong business incentives to document accurately, some records with all of 
the requisite attributes may nonetheless lack reliability due to motivational 
problems or other suspicious factual circumstances.35  In drafting the 
 
 26. Id. at 111. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 991 (2d Cir. 1942). 
 30. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113 (1943) (finding that the engineer’s statement 
was “not a record made for the systematic conduct of the business as a business”). 
 31. Id. at 113. 
 32. Id. at 114. 
 33. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note (“While the [Palmer] opinion 
mentions the motivation of the engineer only obliquely, the emphasis on records of routine 
operations is significant only by virtue of impact on motivation to be accurate.”). 
 34. Id. (quoting id. 803) (noting that “[t]he formulation of specific terms which would 
assure satisfactory results in all cases is not possible”). 
 35. Rule 803(6) also requires that the records include information from an inside source 
with first-hand knowledge and that the information is recorded near the time of the acts, 
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses documented. Id. 803(6). 
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Federal Rules of Evidence, therefore, the Advisory Committee employed 
the trustworthiness exception in the context in which the Supreme Court 
recognized it and included it as part of the hearsay exceptions governing 
both business and public records.  With this historical pedigree, the 
trustworthiness exception has been in place since the Federal Rules were 
enacted.  In 2014, the business and public records exceptions were amended 
“to clarify that if the proponent has established the stated requirements of 
the exception[s], . . . then the burden is on the opponent to show that the 
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation 
indicate a lack of trustworthiness.”36 
II.  A MODEST MODIFICATION:  
EXPANDING THE TRUSTWORTHINESS EXCEPTION 
By a bit of an accident of history, the trustworthiness exception was 
included in Rules 803(6), (7), and (8) due to Supreme Court precedent in 
the business records context.  But the reality recognized in Palmer is the 
same reality critics highlight in questioning the present sense impression 
and excited utterance exceptions.  Indeed, the concerns expressed by Judge 
Posner and others about these Rule 803 exceptions are very reminiscent of 
the concerns underlying the decision in Palmer. 
Even if most present sense impressions and excited utterances are reliable 
because of the context in which they are made, there may be circumstances 
in which even a contemporaneous or excited description of an event may 
appear suspect.37  One example could be a hearsay statement like the one 
admitted in Starr v. Morsette,38 in which a driver said moments after an 
accident that her passenger “grabbed the wheel, causing the pickup to go 
into the ditch and overturn.”39  This is one of those hearsay statements that 
could potentially qualify for admission under both the present sense 
impression exception (if the driver made the comment sufficiently 
contemporaneously to the accident) and the excited utterance exception (if 
the driver uttered the statement while under the stress or excitement caused 
by the rollover accident).40  These exceptions notwithstanding, a driver who 
had just rolled a truck and caused serious injury might recognize instantly 
 
 36. Id. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendment.  Although many courts 
previously placed the burden on the opponent with respect to the trustworthiness exception, 
some had not. Id. 
 37. Judge Posner expresses broader distrust of both exceptions, stating that “there is 
profound doubt whether either should be an exception to the rule against the admission of 
hearsay evidence.” United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 800 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 38. 236 N.W.2d 183 (N.D. 1975). 
 39. Id. at 186.  The statement was admitted in Morsette against the speaker and her 
codefendant under the North Dakota exceptions for statements of party opponents. Id.  An 
expanded trustworthiness exception would not apply to statements of party opponents, the 
admissibility of which does not depend upon their inherent reliability. FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note.  Importantly, the Morsette court noted that the driver’s 
statement would also be admissible as a present sense impression or excited utterance 
without regard to the self-serving nature of the statement. Morsette, 236 N.W.2d at 187.  
Expanding the trustworthiness exception to these exceptions could change this result. 
 40. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1), (2). 
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her own potential liability for the incident.  The self-serving nature of the 
statement that deflects blame and places it on her passenger might appear 
suspicious in light of this reality.  Thus, while most contemporaneous or 
spontaneous excited utterances may be trustworthy, the source and 
circumstances of others may render them suspect.  Judge Posner illustrated 
this point in his Boyce concurrence by noting that humans are capable of 
instantaneous lies under some circumstances.41 
The trustworthiness exception from Rules 803(6)–(8) could be expanded 
to apply to additional Rule 803 exceptions to allow for the realistic and 
individualized assessment of hearsay statements like the one in Morsette.42  
If Rules 803(1) and (2) were amended to add a trustworthiness exception, it 
would operate just like the one in the business records exception.  The 
proponent of a hearsay statement like the one in Morsette would bear the 
burden of demonstrating that the requirements of Rules 803(1) and (2) were 
satisfied in the first instance.  Once the proponent met that burden, the 
statements would become presumptively admissible.  Still, the opponent of 
the evidence could demonstrate the likely motivations of the declarant and 
the suspect self-serving nature of the statement, thus showing that the 
statement does not deserve the presumption of reliability that the categorical 
exceptions afford it.43  Upon a finding that the opponent has met its burden 
of showing a lack of trustworthiness, the trial judge could exclude the 
hearsay statement notwithstanding satisfaction of the Rule 803(1) and (2) 
categorical requirements.  This would answer the longstanding criticism 
that categorical exceptions are capable of admitting “worthless” hearsay 
statements by creating a mechanism for excluding suspect statements that 
happen to fall within the preordained categories. 
III.  A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE PATH FORWARD 
As illustrated above, expanding the trustworthiness exception that is an 
existing feature of the business and public records exceptions could address 
criticisms about the imperfect foundations of certain Rule 803 hearsay 
exceptions.  Importantly, this modest modification to Rule 803 could 
address those criticisms without imposing the same significant costs on the 
 
 41. Boyce, 742 F.3d at 800 (“It’s not true that people can’t make up a lie in a short 
period of time.”). 
 42. Expanding the trustworthiness exception only within Rule 803 makes sense because 
these hearsay exceptions rest most heavily upon the inherent reliability of certain statements. 
See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note.  Further examination is needed to 
determine which Rule 803 exceptions to amend.  While an expanded trustworthiness 
exception is definitely worthy of consideration for the oft-criticized present sense impression 
and excited utterance exceptions, there could be benefits for additional Rule 803 exceptions. 
 43. The opponent could satisfy its burden simply by pointing out these motivational 
defects in the hearsay statement. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to 2014 
amendment (“The opponent . . . is not necessarily required to introduce affirmative evidence 
of untrustworthiness. . . .  [T]he opponent might argue that a record was prepared in 
anticipation of litigation and is favorable to the preparing party without needing to introduce 
evidence on the point.”). 
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trial process—in terms of efficiency, fairness, and consistency—that Judge 
Posner’s purely discretionary proposal would.44 
Allowing exclusion of untrustworthy hearsay falling within the Rule 803 
exceptions could increase the substantive rationality of the categorical 
hearsay exceptions that Judge Posner and others denounce.  The categorical 
exceptions purport to rest heavily on the reliability of particular hearsay 
statements made for specific reasons or in certain contexts.45  The pre-Rules 
concern that categories of hearsay may be underinclusive and may miss 
reliable hearsay was addressed directly through the addition of the residual 
exception.46  Yet, the longstanding concern about the inherent imperfection 
of preordained categories as predictors of reliability and the possibility that 
those categories are overinclusive has never been addressed.47  Borrowing 
the trustworthiness exception from the business and public records 
exceptions to allow the exclusion of unreliable hearsay falling within 
additional preordained categories like the present sense impression and the 
excited utterance could at long last respond to this perceived flaw in the 
categorical system. 
Expanding the trustworthiness exception also would strike a balance 
between the need for judicial discretion in evidentiary rulings and litigants’ 
need for ex ante clarity and consistency regarding the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence.  It would not maximize discretion in the way that Judge 
Posner’s proposal would, because the judge’s discretion to exclude would 
be limited to circumstances in which the opponent of the hearsay satisfied 
its burden of demonstrating some reason to doubt the source of or 
circumstances surrounding the statement.  Still, a trustworthiness exception 
would provide a mechanism for trial judges to perform an individualized 
reliability assessment of specific hearsay statements that fall within the 
Rule 803 exceptions.  This alteration would eliminate the ostensibly rigid 
operation of the categorical model that currently directs trial judges to admit 
hearsay that fits an exception, whether they find it reliable or not.48  This is 
 
 44. See Richter, supra note 17, at 1882–86 (detailing the costs of the Posnerian approach 
to hearsay). 
 45. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 46. FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s note (describing the need for a residual 
exception for “new and unanticipated situations which demonstrate a trustworthiness within 
the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions”). 
 47. See McCormick, supra note 1, at 580–81. 
 48. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 2, § 8.71 (“[C]ourts should be at least 
hesitant to exclude statements that otherwise fit [Rule 803(3)]. . . .  The scheme of 
categorical exceptions reinforces this point (satisfying express requirements is enough)—
only a few, such as the catchall and the ones for business and public records, include broad-
brush references to trustworthiness.”); see also United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 272 
(2d Cir. 1984) (“[I]f a declaration comes within a category defined as an exception, the 
declaration is admissible without any preliminary finding of probable credibility by the 
judge, save for the ‘catch-all’ exceptions of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) and the business 
records exception of Rule 803(6).” (Friendly, J.)).  Although other courts have allowed the 
self-serving nature of state of mind statements to be considered, the point is contested. See 
United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 106 (1st Cir. 2004) (self-serving nature of hearsay 
statements justified exclusion).  Adding a trustworthiness exception to the Rule 803 
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precisely the feature of the present sense impression and excited utterance 
exceptions that the Seventh Circuit lamented in reluctantly admitting 
hearsay statements made to a 911 operator in United States v. Boyce 
because they satisfied the stated requirements of the excited utterance 
exception.49 
Importantly, this modest modification would not deprive the categorical 
exceptions of their procedural integrity and rationality in the same way that 
a purely discretionary model would.50  Even with the expansion of the 
trustworthiness exception, the Rule 803 categorical exceptions would 
continue to allow litigants to predict the admissibility of hearsay evidence 
with the degree of clarity necessary to strategize about viable dispute 
resolution.51  All hearsay within the Rule 803 exceptions would remain 
presumptively admissible and the opponent of the hearsay would bear the 
burden of justifying its exclusion.52  Although federal courts are 
empowered to exclude business and public records using the existing 
trustworthiness exception, this authority has not rendered the business and 
public records exceptions unpredictable and standardless.  Federal courts 
have held the opponents of these records to their burden of showing a lack 
of trustworthiness and have refused to exclude business and public records 
over an opponent’s objection to trustworthiness.53  Where federal courts 
have excluded business and public records due to a lack of trustworthiness, 
they have required the opponent to demonstrate a specific basis for 
doubting the reliability of the record.54  Therefore, the flexibility created by 
the trustworthiness exceptions in the business and public records hearsay 
exceptions has not undermined the utility of those exceptions or rendered 
them unpredictable. 
Accordingly, the familiar and recently clarified framework for 
considering the admissibility of hearsay pursuant to a trustworthiness 
exception would help maintain consistent rulings regarding additional Rule 
803 hearsay exceptions.  All trial judges administering the exception would 
follow the same roadmap.  First, trial judges would require the proponent of 
a hearsay statement to demonstrate that the requirements of a Rule 803 
 
exceptions would clarify this point and allow consideration of reliability within controlled 
parameters that all courts would employ. 
 49. United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[D]espite these issues, 
the exceptions are well-established.”). 
 50. See generally Richter, supra note 17. 
 51. Id. at 1883, 1893–94 (discussing the importance of ex ante information). 
 52. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendment. 
 53. See, e.g., Dortch v. Fowler, 588 F.3d 396, 402–03 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding the 
district court’s application of trustworthiness factors to reject the opponent’s challenge to the 
police accident report); Ellis v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 1984) 
(rejecting the opponent’s trustworthiness challenge to toxic shock studies by the CDC; 
finding that the opponent had failed to satisfy its burden). 
 54. See, e.g., Nachtsheim v. Beech Airlines, 847 F.2d 1261, 1273–75 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(excluding a Bureau of Flight Standards Release where the opponent demonstrated that the 
FAA had cancelled the Release); City of New York v. Pullman, 662 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 
1981) (rejecting Urban Mass Transit Administration Report where the opponent 
demonstrated that the proponent supplied the data that served as the basis for the report). 
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exception are satisfied, thus rendering the hearsay presumptively 
admissible.  Only then would trial judges shift the burden to the opponent 
of the hearsay to point to specific reasons to doubt the reliability of the 
otherwise admissible statement.  This familiar framework would help 
ensure consistent applications of the trustworthiness exception across cases 
and courtrooms akin to those that have been made under the business and 
public records exceptions.  Further, this well-understood framework would 
continue to be driven by the categorical exceptions and would allow for 
quick application during a fast-paced trial process, thus eliminating the need 
for costly in limine motions to resolve all hearsay objections. 
Finally, and crucially, this modest modification of the Rule 803 
exceptions that utilizes an existing feature of Rule 803 would avoid a 
painful period of adjustment and uncertainty concerning the admissibility of 
hearsay.  While meaningfully addressing longstanding concerns about the 
rationality of certain hearsay exceptions, this amendment would not scuttle 
well-accepted hearsay exceptions that have proved invaluable to the trial 
process.55 
CONCLUSION 
Criticism of the categorical hearsay exceptions for allowing the 
unreliable to find its way into our trial process has continued unabated since 
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence and has recently resurfaced 
prominently in the Seventh Circuit opinion in Boyce.56  The purely 
discretionary approach to hearsay proposed by Judge Posner runs counter to 
the original purpose of the highly successful Federal Rules of Evidence, 
would prove costly and detrimental to the trial process, and should not be 
pursued.57 
The Advisory Committee could credibly choose to ignore the continuing 
criticism of the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions by concluding that the 
categorical exceptions are serving their crucial certainty purpose and need 
not achieve accurate reliability assessments in every case, notwithstanding 
their purported grounding in trustworthiness.  Turning a deaf ear to 
complaints about the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions will not quiet the 
increasingly vocal critics of the categorical model, however.  Expanding the 
trustworthiness exception that is an existing feature of the business and 
public records exceptions to the oft-excoriated present sense impression and 
excited utterance exceptions could increase confidence in the integrity of 
the categorical hearsay model, without imposing the deleterious costs of a 
purely discretionary approach.  Adding a “trustworthiness” reality check to 
 
 55. See Liesa L. Richter, Don’t Just Do Something!:  E-hearsay, the Present Sense 
Impression, and the Case for Caution in the Rulemaking Process, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1657, 
1699 (2012). (discussing the importance of the present sense impression in the fight against 
domestic violence). 
 56. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 57. See Richter, supra note 17, at 1894–907. 
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additional Rule 803 hearsay exceptions is, therefore, worthy of further 
exploration.58 
 
 58. This brief Article is inadequate to explore fully the ramifications of expanding the 
trustworthiness exception.  Questions about which Rule 803 exceptions to alter, as well as 
the drafting of an expanded trustworthiness exception, remain to be examined.  This Article 
is designed to introduce the concept as a more viable antidote to concerns about the Rule 803 
hearsay exceptions than the Posner proposal discussed at this symposium. 
